We propose an duopoly game where quantity-setting …rms have incomplete information about the demand function. In each time step, they solve a pro…t maximization problem assuming a linear local approximation of the demand function. In particular, we construct an example using the well known duopoly Puu's model with isoelastic demand function and constant marginal costs. An explicit form of the dynamical system that describes the time evolution of the duopoly game with boundedly rational players is given. The main result is the global stability of the system.
Introduction
An oligopoly is a market structure between the two extreme cases of monopoly and of perfect competition; from a theoretical point of view, Cournot, in 1838 [2] has introduced the …rst formal theory of oligopoly and the duopolistic Cournot model is one of the most well know subjects of economic dynamics.
Often, in a static setting, the model is solved using the notion of Nash equilibrium, this kind of solution in market games implies that each …rms knows the entire demand curve of the good it produces, has perfect foresight about the next period production of the other …rms operating in the same market; from a computational point of view, Nash equilibrium implies also that the players are able to solve a one period optimization problem.
In 1978 Rand [7] and Poston and Steward [4] , in a dynamic setting based on the reaction functions, showed that, under suitable conditions, simple duopoly would lead to complex dynamic phenomena. The dynamical complexity arises from the unimodal character of the reaction function, i.e., the curve that shows how to react, in the optimal way, with respect to the past strategy of the competitor. In the last two paper, the reaction functions are not derived from the solution of an optimization problem but are proposed by the authors in an exogenous and abstract way.
In 1991 Puu [5] suggested the …rst example of duopolistic model with unimodal reaction functions, derived from the optimization of pro…t functions, that gives rise to complex phenomena. It is assumed an isoelastic demand function, which always arises when the consumer have Cobb-Douglas preferences type, combined with constant marginal costs. The model was shown to produce a period doubling sequence of ‡ip bifurcations ending in chaos for the outputs of each of the two competitors.
Since then, many contributions has been proposed in order to enrich the simple economic assumptions of the Cournot original model. Among numerous references listed in [6] and in [8] , the reader can …nd many di¤erent examples of the Cournot oligopoly game with complex dynamics. This paper investigates a learning duopoly model; the oligopolists do not know the demand function they face, but they believe it is linear and they estimate such a linear function through the knowledge of the current market state in terms of quantity and price and on the basis of local knowledge of the demand curve. This adjustment process was introduced by Tuinstra [9] , and Bischi et al. [1] , Naimzada and Sbragia [3] who analyzed it for price-setting and quantity-setting oligopolies, respectively.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamic behavior of a duopoly game with two …rms learning about the demand curve through the local linear approximation process; to this end, we will use Puu's model and demonstrate our main result; the discrete dynamical system that arises considering two boundedly rational players that use local linear approximation, is globally stable. The plan of the paper is as follows: In section 2, is constructed and described Puu's simple nonlinear duopoly model . In Section 3, is presented a duopoly model with isoelastic demand curve and constant marginal costs and local linear approximation of the demand curve.
In section 4, the dynamics of a duopoly game with boundedly rational player is analyzed. Section 5 considers an example in which is analyzed numerically and graphically the evolution of the quantities chosen by the oligopolists. In section 6 we compare the expected pro…ts of the …rms in the two di¤erent settings, the one with global knowledge and the one with local knowledge.
The Puu model
Puu [5] builds a model using a demand function in which price (P ) is reciprocal to the total demand function (Q):
The (1) represents an isoelastic demand function, because the elasticity of the demand is constant. In the duopoly case there are two …rms (…rm 1 and …rm 2) producing two perfect substitute goods (q 1 and q 2 ). Under the assumption that total demand is equal to total supply, we know that Q = q 1 + q 2 .
Analyzing the nonlinear Cournot output adjustment, we know that at period t + 1; each …rm produces a quantity of good that depends on the expected price for the period, which depends on the quantities produced by both the duopolists. So, each …rm has to make an expectation on the competitor's production. In this way …rm 1 produces a quantity q 1 (t + 1), given the expected production of …rm 2 (q e 2 (t + 1) ), whereas …rm 2 produces a quantity q 2 (t + 1), given the expected production of …rm 1 (q e 1 (t + 1)). The chosen quantities q 1 (t + 1) and q 2 (t + 1) are such that …rms maximize their expected pro…ts that are (under the assumption of linear costs): e 1 (t + 1) = q 1 (t + 1) q 1 (t + 1) + q e 2 (t + 1)
where c 1 and c 2 are the marginal costs of the …rms 1 and 2 respectively.
Maximizing pro…ts using naïve expectations (i.e. q e 1 (t + 1) = q 1 (t) and q e 2 (t + 1) = q 2 (t)) we obtain the dynamic process:
8 < :
where productions are both positive if 
that we can call Cournot point. In the Cournot point the ratios of the outputs and the pro…ts are given by:
The results (5) permit to conclude that (under the assumptions of isoelastic demand function, linear costs and naïve expectations):
Theorem 1 At the Cournot point the more e¢ cient …rm obtain an higher pro…t and produces more output than the other one
In the theorem the terms "more e¢ cient" indicate the …rm whose marginal cost is lower, in fact:
In order to analyze the local stability of the Cournot point, we evaluate in that point the Jacobian matrix:
Trace and determinant of J c (T r(J c ) and Det(J c )) are 1 and (c 1 c 2 ) 2 =4c 1 c 2 respectively.
The eigenvalues ( 1;2 ) are the solutions of the characteristic equation 2 T r(J c ) + Det(J c ) and the Cournot point is stable if the absolute value of both the eigenvalues are lower than one.
This condition is realized when:
The condition (8) implies that in the special case of c 1 = c 2 the Cournot point is stable.
When the condition (8) is violated, the Cournot point is unstable and increasing the ratio c 2 =c 1 we can observe the period doubling sequence of bifurcations leading to chaos.
The conjectured demand function
In this section we propose the boundedly rational adjustment process in which we will analyze the evolution of the quantities chosen by the oligopolists. Firms produce homogeneous products and the price depends on the total output of the industry according to the inverse demand function:
where Q(t) = P n j=1 q j is the total output of the oligopoly market and n is the number of the oligopolistic …rms operating in the market.
The inverse demand function satis…es the canonical conditions about demand: f (Q(t)) > 0 and f 0 (Q(t) 0, with Q > 0. In time period t each …rm through the local knowledge of the demand function de…nes the conjectured demand function and then the …rm will optimize the expected pro…ts.
The local knowledge of the demand function means that the …rm knows the current market price, p(t), the corresponding quantity Q(t), produced by the …rms and demanded by the market and, through market experiments, the local linear approximation of the demand function in the point represented by the current price and by the current quantity produced, (p(t); Q(t)). These elements are su¢ cient for the local approximation of the demand function; we can de…ne the conjectured demand for the next period t + 1:
where Q e (t + 1) represents the aggregate conjectured production for time t + 1. Then using the demand function we obtain:
We suppose that all the players adopt the cournotian expectations formation hypotesis, i.e.
the static expectations; let q i (t) de…nes the production at time t of the …rms other than i, q i (t) = P n j=1 q j (t) with j 6 = i, then the conjectured demand function becomes:
where q e i (t + 1) is the expectation by the i-th …rm about the production in period t + 1 by the other …rms. According to cournotian hypotesis of static expectation …rm i expects that other …rms will produce the quantity of the previous period: q e i (t + 1) = q i (t) = n X j=1 q j (t) with j 6 = i, then eq.(12) becomes:
Finally we have:
In …g.1 we represent the market conditions, (Q(t); p(t)) and the outcome of the learning process:
The producers are quantity setting, so at each time period t they decide the next period production q i (t + 1) by maximizing the expected pro…t at period t + 1, e i (t + 1):
The …rst order condition for the maximization of the i-th expected pro…t is:
It is easily veri…ed the second order condition.
If the dynamics of the system are based upon the best response function, the evolution of the quantities produced by the …rms is de…ned by the following system of …rst order nonlinear di¤erence equations:
2f 0 (Q(t)) :::::::::::::::::::::::::::
4 Dynamic analysis of the Puu model with boundedly rational agents
In this section we consider a duopoly model in which the demand function is the isoelastic one.
The model (17) with n = 2 and demand function (1) becomes a two dimensional dynamical system, de…ned by the iterated map:
T :
The relationship between the stationary equilibrium of the map (18) and the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding static duopoly game is de…ned by the following proposition given by Bischi et al. [1] :
The dynamical system (18) has an unique equilibrium, given by q = (q 1 ; q 2 ),
According to Propos.1 the stationary state q is also the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot duopoly game with isoelastic demand function. We can note that the steady state (19) is the same of the Puu duopoly model (4).
The main result of our work concerns the global stability of the Nash equilibrum:
Proposition 2 The dynamical system (18) is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof Let us introduce the auxiliary variable S(t) de…ned as the aggregate production at each time period t: S(t) = q 1 (t) + q 2 (t). Now, summing up the left hand sides and the right hand sides of the equations forming the system (18) we obtain the three-dimensional system:
The third equation of the system (20) implies that the aggregate production of a period only depends on its value on the previous period. In particular, the right hand side of the third equation represents a concave parabola with two …xed points: the trivial one S 0 = 0 (always unstable) and another one characterized by a positive value of the aggregate production Fig.2) . The positive steady state S 1 is always located on the increasing branch of the parabola (i.e. S 1 is lower than the maximum point S max = 3 2(c 1 +c 2 ) ) and this implies that it is globally asymptotically stable. In fact, if the initial condition is located on the region I (0 < S < S 1 ) the function is located above the diagonal, where S(t + 1) > S(t), and the succession of the values of the aggregated production is bounded by S 1 :The monotonicity and the boundedness are su¢ cient conditions to conclude that starting from I the sequence of aggregate production converge monotonically to S 1 . If S 0 is located inside the region III (S > (S 1 ) 1 ) then in period 1 the aggregate production will be a value belonging to the region I and from there we have seen that the convergence is monotonic to the positive steady state. For the region II the mechanism is analogue to the one used for the region I, with the only di¤erence that the monotonic convergence is decreasing.
This implies that the line S = S 1 , which is mapped into itself by T 1 , is globally attracting for the trajectories of T 1 . In other words, the limit set of any trajectory of the map T 1 belongs to the trapping line S = S 1 (line of !-limit set) and is an invariant set of the restriction of T 1 to such line, which can be identi…ed with the two one-dimensional linear maps (limiting maps):
The steady states of the limit maps are q 1 and q 2 respectively and they are both globally asymptotically stable, in fact the lines on the right hand side of T !1 and T !2 have both a slope equal to 0:5.
This result implies that, di¤erently from the Puu's model, even if the di¤erence between the marginal costs of the …rms is quite marked, their productions will always converge to the Nash equilibrium, i.e. a lower degree of rationality increases the stability of the system. In particular, the production at each time period is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The trajectory in each period given by the map (18) is de…ned by:
where q 1 (0) and q 2 (0) are the production in the initial period and z s (k) = S(k)(1 S(k)c s )=2
for s = 1; 2.
Proof Using again the aggregate production variable S(t) we can rewrite the map (18) in the following manner:
If we introduce a new variable z s (t) S(t)(1 S(t)c s )=2 the system becomes:
which is a system formed by a couple of non-autonomous …rst-order linear di¤erence equations of the form: q s (t + 1) = aq s (t) + z s (t) ,with a = 1=2 and s = 1; 2 and from which the trajectories (22) derive.
The dynamics of quantities and pro…t functions: an example
In this section we propose an example in which we analyze the evolution of the quantities chosen by the oligopolists. We are also going to show how the …rms build every period an approximation of the demand function and an approximation of the pro…t function. With our numerical exercise we intend to show, step by step, how local approximation of the demand function operates in the particular case of a Cournot duopoly game (n = 2) with an isoelastic demand function:
together with linear cost functions:
we can substitute the demand function (25) and the cost function (26) into (18) to obtain the reaction functions.
Let us consider the case in which producers have di¤erent marginal costs, in particular: Suppose that at the initial period (t = 0) we have:
so …rm 1 produces more than its Nash equilibrium quantity, whereas …rm 2 produces less than it. We can …nd the price using the demand function (25):
At the end of the initial period, the …rms make their expectations on the next period (t = 1).
Let us consider …rm 1. Its real pro…t depends on the quantities produced by both the competitors:
in particular, in the initial period, we can substitute the value of the initial choice of the competitor obtaining the pro…t of the …rm 1 as a function of its initial choice:
We can see that q 1 = q 1 (0) = 0:4 does not maximize (30) but this is not surprising because the initial conditions are not the results of a decision process of the …rms.
At the end of the period …rm 1 knows the value of the partial derivative of the demand function in the point corresponding to the total output produced in the initial period:
which can be used to compute the expected price for the period 1 according to (10):
so the price expected by …rm 1 only depends on its own quantity and does not depend on the expectation concerning the competitor's quantity. Firm 1 can use (32) to obtain its pro…t for the period 1:
The expected pro…t function (33) has a maximum in the point q 1 = 0:35 which is the quantity chosen by the …rm 1 for the period 1 (q 1 (1)). The real pro…t obtained by the …rm 1 at the time t = 1, depends on the quantity chosen by the concurrent …rm which, following the same mechanism seen for …rm 1, is q 2 (1) = 0:225:
At the end of the period 1, the …rm correctly estimates the partial derivative of the demand function:
and use it to forecasts the price for the next period (t = 2): 
Now, in order to calculate the real pro…t obtained by the …rm 1, we need to know the quantity chosen by the concurrent …rm, q 2 (2) ' 0:3, and use it to obtain the right section of the real pro…t function:
Also in this period the quantity chosen by the …rm 1 (q 1 (2)) is not the optimum choice given the quantity produced by the concurrent, but is closer than the previous-period one to the Nash-equilibrium quantity.
If we continue to repeat this mechanism, we observe that, after some periods, the quantity produced by the …rm 1 converges to the Nash-equilibrium quantity. Also the expected pro…t function converges to a …nal function (…nal expected pro…t function).
In …g. 3 (a,b) we can see, on the plane (q 1 ; 1 ) and on the 3D space (q 1 ; q 2 ; 1 ), the quantities chosen by …rm 1 in the …rst three periods and at the end of the process. In …g. 4 (a,b) we have the corresponding situation of the …rm 2. We can also see the expected pro…t functions ( e (t)
is the short form for the expected pro…t of the …rm 1 in …g.3 and for the …rm 2 in …g.4) and the section of the real pro…t function corresponding to the quantity chosen by the …rms in the …rst three periods and at the end of the process ( (t) is the short form for 1 j q 2 =q 2 (t) in …g.3 and the short form for 2 j q 1 =q 1 (t) in …g.4). The point A corresponds to the initial condition and is also the point in which the section of the pro…t function corresponding to the initial choice of the competitor is tangent to the expected pro…t function for the next period; in other words …rms think that continuing to produce the same quantities they obtain also the same pro…t (this because every …rm expects that the competitor will not change its choice). This is true every time period. The point B is the point in which …rm 1 supposes it will be in the period 1, whereas the point B 0 is the point in which it really is in that period. Points C and C 0 have the same meaning for the period 2. The curve N E is the section of the pro…t function corresponding to the Nash Equilibrium quantity of the competitor and e N E is the …nal expected pro…t function. These two curves have the same maximum point (which is the Nash Equilibrium quantity) and the same maximum value (the real pro…t when the two …rms produce their Nash Equilibrium quantities). In the next section we try to generalize this result.
Comparison between expected pro…t functions. The case of isoelastic demand function
In this section we compare the expected pro…ts of …rms which know the real shape of the demand function with the pro…ts corresponding to …rms that operate under local approximation of the demand function. We consider again the case in which the demand function is isoelastic.
In both cases we consider, like in the previous sections, the case of naïve expectations. Before we proceed it could be useful to underscore that …rms have to make an expectation both on the shape of the demand function and on the production of the competitor. We analyze the case in which …rms adopt naïve expectations concerning the competitor's output but in one case they also need to estimate the demand function (using local approximation), so the comparison is between the classic Cournot-Puu model and our boundedly rational agent model.
Expected pro…ts in the Cournot-Puu model
At each time period t, …rm 1 (for the …rm 2 we only need to invert 1 and 2 in what follows)
builds an expected pro…t function for the period t + 1, given the outputs and the price realized in t:
where C 1 (q 1 ) is a generic cost function.
In the Cournot-Puu model the …rm knows the shape of the demand function, so using naïve expectations we have:
Substituting the expected price (40) in the expected pro…t function (39) we obtain: 
Expected pro…ts with local approximation of the demand function
Let us consider now the case in which …rms don't know the shape of the demand function and, at each time period t, use realized outputs and price to build a linear approximation of the demand curve.
In this case, according to (14), the expected price is:
Using the expected price (42) in the expected pro…t function (39), we obtain:
The comparison
Now we want to make some considerations on the di¤erence ( ) between the two expected pro…t function, that is:
A …rst consideration is that the di¤erence does not depend on the shape of the cost function (if the costs of each …rm only depends on its own output).
A second (and more obvious) consideration is that = 0 if q 1 (t + 1) = 0. In particular in both the cases, …rms know that their revenue is 0 if they don't produce at all.
More interesting is the analysis with positive production. After some algebraic manipulation (and excluding the case q 1 (t + 1) = 0) we can easily prove that:
with g(q 1 (t + 1)) = (q 1 (t + 1)) 2 2q 1 (t + 1)q 1 (t) + (q 1 (t)) 2 .
The convex parabola g(q 1 (t+1)) is tangent to the horizontal axis in the point q 1 (t+1) = q 1 (t)
and positive for all the other value of q 1 (t + 1). So we can conclude that:
Given an isoelastic demand function and naïve expectations, the pro…ts expected by a …rm that knows the shape of the real demand function, are higher then the ones expected by the same …rm if it does not know the demand function and approximate it using local approximation. The expected pro…ts are the same only if q 1 (t + 1) = 0 or q 1 (t + 1) = q 1 (t).
In the next section we prove that this result is the consequence of the convexity of the isoelastic demand function and that the result does not change using another convex demand function.
7 Comparison between expected pro…t functions. The case of a generic convex demand function
What we have found for the isoelastic demand function is caused by its convexity. We can prove it in a graphic way: As we have seen in the previous section the di¤erence between expected pro…t functions does not depend on the costs, so we can consider a case without them.
In the …rst picture we can see that if the …rm 1 produce at time t + 1 the same output produced in t, the rectangles, whose area measures the pro…ts in the Cournot-Puu and in the local approximation case are coincident and this happens because the two curves are tangent in that point.
The second picture represents the case in which …rm 1 produces in t + 1 an higher quantity of output with respect to the previous period t. In this case, the convexity of the demand function makes higher the height of the rectangle whose area measure the expected pro…t in the Cournot-Puu case, whereas the base is the same in both cases. It is easy to see that this is caused both by the convexity of the demand function and the linearity of the expected demand function in the local approximation case. In fact, given that the curves are tangent for q 1 (t + 1) = q 1 (t), for all the other values of q 1 (t + 1) the convex curve is higher then the linear one (by de…nition of convexity). So the same happens for all the (positive) values of q 1 (t + 1)
except for q 1 (t + 1) = q 1 (t) .
The isoelastic demand function introduced by Puu is a convex function so the result of the previous section is just a consequence of it.
We could easily show that if the demand function is concave then the expected pro…t in the local approximation case will be always higher then in the Cournot case (except for q 1 (t + 1) = q 1 (t)).
Conclusions
Our work moves from a well known duopoly model with isoelastic demand function in which the …rms are endowed with naïve expectations (Puu-Cournot duopoly). In that case for values of the ratio between the marginal costs that are su¢ ciently high or low, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium loses stability via ‡ip bifurcation, so we can …nd locally stable period cycles or even a chaotic attractor.
In this study we modify the assumptions concerning the rationality of the …rms. In particular,
we propose a repeated game in which …rms are endowed with a lower degree of rationality and a lower information set than the Puu-Cournot …rms. Firms get the correct local estimate of the demand function and then they use such estimate for a linear approximation of the demand function. On the basis of this subjective demand function they solve their pro…t maximization problem.
We prove that under these alternative assumptions the unique steady state is globally asymptotically stable for any possible con…guration of the marginal costs. This result implies that a decreasing in degree of rationality, in this case, does not lead to a destabilization of the model but it has the opposite stabilizing e¤ect.
We also compare the expected pro…t function of the …rms in both cases, proving that for (almost) all the expected values of the output of the concurrent …rm, the duopolists, in our model, expect an higher pro…t than the Puu-Cournot ones. An exception is given by the expected pro…t on the Nash equilibrium in which they are both equal to the real one and they both maximize the respective expected pro…t function. We generalize these results to all models with convex demand function.
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